Federal Appeals Court upholds confession of "Making a Murderer" subject Brendan Dassey
In Dassey v. Dittmann (December 2017) the U.S.Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, upheld the admissibility of Brendan Dassey's confession, ruling that the state court's determination that defendant confessed to murder voluntarily was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. From the Court of Appeals decision:
Whether Dassey's confession was voluntary or not is measured against a general standard that takes into account the totality of the circumstances. Some factors would tend to support a finding that Dassey's confession was not voluntary: his youth, his limited intellectual ability, some suggestions by the interrogators, their broad assurances to a vulnerable suspect that honesty would produce leniency, and inconsistencies in Dassey's confession. Many other factors, however, point toward a finding that it was voluntary. Dassey spoke with the interrogators freely, after receiving and understanding Miranda warnings,and with his mother's consent. The interrogation took place in a comfortable setting, without any physical coercion or intimidation, without even raised voices, and over a relatively brief time. Dassey provided many of the most damning details himself in response to open-ended questions. On a number of occasions he resisted the interrogators' strong suggestions on particular details. Also, the investigators made no specific promises of leniency.
After the state courts found the confession voluntary, a federal district court and a divided panel of this court found that the state courts' decision was unreasonable and that Dassey was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. The state courts' finding that Dassey's confession was voluntary was not beyond fair debate, but we conclude it was reasonable. We reverse the grant of Dassey's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Turning to the techniques used in the interrogation, the investigators told Dassey many times that they already knew what had happened when in fact they did not. Such deception is a common interview technique. To our knowledge, it has not led courts (and certainly not the Supreme Court) to find that a subject's incriminating answers were involuntary. Also, most of the incriminating details in Dassey's confession were not suggested by the questioners. He volunteered them in response to open-ended questions.
The requirement that courts take "special care" in analyzing juvenile confessions does not call for habeas relief here. The state appellate court met the requirements for analyzing juvenile confessions by considering Dassey's age, his intellectual capacity, and the voluntary absence of hismother during the interrogation. The state court noted that the officers read Dassey his Miranda rightsand that Dassey later remembered his rights and agreed to talk anyway. The court assessed coercion in relation to Dassey's vulnerabilities, including his�age, intellectual limitations and high suggestibility.� The court did not limit its inquiry to only whether the most abusive interrogation techniques were used. The court examined the tones and volumes of the investigators' voices, finding that the officers �used normal speaking tones, with no hectoring, threats or promises of leniency,� though they did prod Dassey to be honest and sought to establish a rapport with him. The court even considered Dassey's physical comfort by noting he sat on a sofa and was offered food,drink, and restroom breaks.