In the case of People v.Wroten Dr. Richard Leo testified that the interrogators suggested to the defendant "that the offense was accidental, thereby minimizing the suspect's perception of the consequences of an admission and implying that an accidental killing might result in leniency. This technique can increase the risk of a false confession." The court rejected this position and the jury convicted the defendant of first degree murder. In their review of the case the Court of Appeal, 2nd District, Division 2, California stated "There were also no promises of leniency made to appellant. The statements he points to as making such promises are at worst ambiguous and, in any event, did not pervade the interrogation. Detective Lait's statement that they were giving appellant a "million dollar opportunity" to explain whether the shooting was intentional or accidental contains no promise of benefit. While the detective stated that knowing whether the murder was intentional or accidental might make a difference in "how we proceed," he did not say it would benefit appellant or that it would make a difference as to whether they would proceed. Furthermore, after Detective Lait made those statements, appellant continued to deny involvement in the Mosley shooting....Those statements did not overbear his will to resist and proximately cause him to confess. Detective Garrido's statement that they wanted to get appellant "cleared up" was little more than encouragement to tell the truth." Click here for the complete decision

In the case of People v.Muratalla Dr. Richard Leo suggested that the defendant's consent to search may have been given as the result of improper police questioning techniques. The Court of Appeals decision stated that "Leo opined that threatening to arrest a suspect's girlfriend or to have the suspect's child removed in order to gain access to the suspect's residence would qualify as coercive threats. Such threats, if used to gain consent, would also affect the suspect's subsequent perceptions about whether the suspect should make statements during an interrogation." The trial court found that "under the totality of circumstances, Muratalla's consent to search was voluntary. The court found that assuming the officers had discussed the possibility of having DCFS take custody of the children and had handcuffed Dorame in Muratalla's presence, such conduct did not induce Muratalla "to do something that he otherwise might not have done." The court noted that it would have found Muratalla's consent to have been involuntary had the officers said to Muratalla that his son would be removed by DCFS and his girlfriend would be arrested unless he agreed to the search of his residence. But in the absence of such a direct threat by the officers, the trial court concluded that Muratalla's consent was obtained without police coercion." The Court of Appeals, 2nd Disrtict, California affirmed the trial court's decision. Click here for the complete decision.

In their decision in the case of People v. Cota, the Court of Appeal, 4th District, Division 3, California reported the following:

"During trial, defense psychological expert Dr. Richard Ofshe testified about interrogation tactics used by police in order to elicit confessions from suspects and factors that contribute to suspects making false confessions. During closing argument, the prosecutor read an excerpt from a law review article in which Ofshe was quoted as saying: " 'While a guilty party will likely be very unhappy that he is being accused and confronted with evidence that supports the accusation, he is somewhat insulated from shock because he has always been aware of possible detection and can understand that he has been caught. An innocent suspect is likely to experience considerable shock and disorientation during interrogation because he is wholly unprepared for the confrontation and accusations that are at the core of the process and will not understand how an investigator could possibly suspect him.'

The prosecutor then proceeded to argue, "[w]hen you look at this videotape [of the defendant's interview with Campuzano], ask yourself that question. Where is the shock of being accused of these horrific crimes? ... There isn't because the defendant knew what he did, period. And because this evidence is so compelling, because it is so compelling, the defense is grasping at straws.... And all they need to do is fool one of you. If they fool one of you, then the defendant is not held responsible." Click here for the complete decision.

In the case of Lyons v. State Lyons sought to have Dr. Richard Ofshe testify as an expert witness on false confession theory. Following a hearing outside the jury's presence at which Ofshe testified, the trial court ruled that it would not allow the testimony based upon the evidence in the case, because such theory had not reached a verifiable stage of scientific certainty, and because whether Lyons's inculpatory statements were the results of threats or coercion was a matter the jury could discern for itself. "This Court further observed in Riley that the admission of expert testimony based on the theory of false confessions was premature and unreliable inasmuch as there was insufficient scientific support and too many unanswered questions regarding such theory. Id. at 682-683(4), 604 S.E.2d 488. In short, false confession theory does not satisfy the evidentiary test in criminal cases set forth in Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519(1), 292 S.E.2d 389 (1982)." Click here for the complete decision.

In the case of US v. Mamah the US District Court, N.D. Illinois granted the government's motion to bar Dr. Richard Ofshe's testimony, stating that "The jury will not be, and cannot be, assisted in any way by Dr. Ofshe's views in determining whether Mr. Mamah's version of the interrogation is more accurate than that of the interviewing agents, assuming material conflict. It is a classic jury function to determine the credibility of witnesses. That Dr. Ofshe can say some people confess falsely when faced with certain stimuli is not relevant to the jury's credibility determination function. Nor can Dr. Ofshe testify, as part of his work, what the specifics of the interrogation consisted of as related to him by Mr. Mamah. Mr. Mamah's statements to him about the interview would be inadmissible hearsay and could not be disclosed by Dr. Ofshe to the jury pursuant to Rule 703. Beyond that, Dr. Ofshe employs mere conclusory statements in his report about tactics used without specifics or elaboration. As is recited in Hall at p. 1344, conclusory statements without any explanation why the expert can contribute to the jury's understanding of the subject are also subject to exclusion. That is also the situation here." Click here for the complete decision.