Court Clarifies an Ambiguous Request for an Attorney
Written By:
Reid
Mar 30, 2007
In the case Davis v. State, decided March 23, 2007 by the Texas Court of Appeals, the court examined the issue as to whether or not the defendant made an unambiguous request for an attorney during a custodial interrogation:
"But, an officer need not stop his questioning unless the suspect's invocation of rights is unambiguous, and the officer is not required to clarify ambiguous remarks." Id. The suspect's comments must "clearly manifest his desire to remain silent." Mayes, 8 S.W.3d at 358. The totality of circumstances surrounding the interrogation and alleged invocation must illustrate that the suspect actually invoked his right. See Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 351 (Tex.Crim.App.1995).
The totality of circumstances surrounding the interrogation and Davis's alleged invocation of his right indicate that Davis never unambiguously invoked his rights to remain silent or terminate the interrogation. Davis's counsel all but conceded at the suppression hearing that Davis's initial "invocation" was ambiguous-i.e., that Davis " either was expressing to you that he did not want to talk any further or that he did not want to talk about a particular topic." (Emphasis added.) Moreover, Davis then immediately followed his assertion, "I really don't want to talk about it," with the statement, "I mean, I ain't the one that did it." Davis reinitiated any interrogation with his immediate denial of wrongdoing made less than a second after the alleged invocation of his right to terminate. By following an ambiguous invocation of his right to silence or to terminate the interview "with more speech, separated by little more than a breath, it is clear [he] resolved [his] dilemma; in short, [he] wanted to talk. Thus, we do not find this initial comment of appellant to be an unambiguous assertion of the right to remain silent."
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"But, an officer need not stop his questioning unless the suspect's invocation of rights is unambiguous, and the officer is not required to clarify ambiguous remarks." Id. The suspect's comments must "clearly manifest his desire to remain silent." Mayes, 8 S.W.3d at 358. The totality of circumstances surrounding the interrogation and alleged invocation must illustrate that the suspect actually invoked his right. See Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 351 (Tex.Crim.App.1995).
The totality of circumstances surrounding the interrogation and Davis's alleged invocation of his right indicate that Davis never unambiguously invoked his rights to remain silent or terminate the interrogation. Davis's counsel all but conceded at the suppression hearing that Davis's initial "invocation" was ambiguous-i.e., that Davis " either was expressing to you that he did not want to talk any further or that he did not want to talk about a particular topic." (Emphasis added.) Moreover, Davis then immediately followed his assertion, "I really don't want to talk about it," with the statement, "I mean, I ain't the one that did it." Davis reinitiated any interrogation with his immediate denial of wrongdoing made less than a second after the alleged invocation of his right to terminate. By following an ambiguous invocation of his right to silence or to terminate the interview "with more speech, separated by little more than a breath, it is clear [he] resolved [his] dilemma; in short, [he] wanted to talk. Thus, we do not find this initial comment of appellant to be an unambiguous assertion of the right to remain silent."